Diagnosis of the World's Elastic Currency Problems by Frame, A. J.
DIAGNOSIS OF THE WORLD’S ELASTIC CURRENCY
PROBLEMS
By ANDREW J. FRAME,
President Waukesha National Bank, Waukesha, Wisconsin.
Professor Sumner, in his &dquo;History of American Currency,&dquo; said,
m summing up the doctrines of the celebrated bullion report which
was submitted to the House of Commons in 18io, &dquo;Its doctrines are
the alphabet of modern finance. They are no longer disputable.&dquo;
Another section reads, &dquo;In the presence of a panic the duty of the
bank is to discount freely to all solvent parties.&dquo;
I take it, a smile will pass over the features of my banker friends
the moment their ne’er-to-be-forgotten practical experiences of 1893
and 1907 loom up as a nightmare before them again. How can a
bank discount freely to all solvent parties when its panic-stricken
depositors want all the cash the bank holds, and very quickly too ?
What is the meaning of the word panic? The Standard Dic-
tionary says: &dquo;The prevalence of unreasoning and overpowering
alarm in financial and commercial circles, or in both, leading to
sudden and stringent restrictions of credit and great shrinkage in
values, and precipitating mercantile and banking failures; often
the precursor of a financial panic.&dquo;
Panics undoubtedly cannot be wholly prevented except in
theory by such dreamers as Bellamy, who support the impossible
idea that human nature can be changed, speculation cease and opti-
mism be eradicated from Anglo-Saxonism.
Notwithstanding this, I am a firm believer in ameliorating panic
conditions, both as to their frequency and as to their severity. But
how ? My answer is:
( r ) By studying history and profiting by the experiences of
the past.
(2) By passing conservative and sound banking laws, and then
enforcing them.
(3) By giving as much elasticity to the circulating medium as
can be safely attained, but never to reach an amount which engenders
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doubt in the public mind as to its redemption in the world’s standard
of value.
As to the problem of conservative and sound banking laws and
enforcement, the national banking system is the safest and best this
country has known. It is a well-known fact that some states have
good laws, some lax laws, and others none at all. It is also a matter
of gratification to know that many states are working along the line
of betterment. With thirteen thousand million dollars due to not
less than sixteen million depositors in the banks and trust companies
of the United States, in order that conditions leading to panics and
their paralyzing effects may be minimized, is it not the clear duty
of our statesmen to perfect, as far as possible, conservative laws on
sound lines?
These laws should demand ample capital paid in, limitations
on loans to any person or firm, and reasonable reserves according to
whether deposits are payable on demand or on time. As space
forbids further pursuit of this phase of the subject, I will confine
myself to the knotty &dquo;elasticity problem.&dquo;
The Elasticity Problem
The history of the progress of nations during the earlier cen-
turies shows an evolution from the use of bullocks as a medium
of exchange, as recorded in the Bible, to the later period of barter
by the use of beads, nails, skins, shells, etc. In later centuries,
in addition to the limited quantities of coin, the banks have indulged
more or less in the issue of so-called asset or credit currency,
dubbed &dquo;coined credit,&dquo; by Professor Sumner, as well as cur-
rency secured by various kinds of collateral. All makeshifts have
in the most advanced and progressive nations given way to the
world’s standard of value-gold, until to-day those progressive
nations which issue currency do so largely through one great cen-
tral bank. The immense coin reserves of these great banks prac-
tically make their currency issues a gold certificate payable on
demand. They are practically banks of issue and not of deposit,
as will be seen by the table which follows. These banks issue more
or less currency in excess of coin held, but some are based on gov-
ernment securities, as in England; all their loans are amply secured
and of a quick liquid character. In view of these facts, these
great banks, with immense capital, coin reserves and small liabilities,
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are in a position to expand currency issues to move crops without
distrust, and under panic conditions &dquo;to discount freely to all
solvent parties,&dquo; also to furnish extra cash to banks with which
to meet the insane demands of frightened depositors, thus pre-
venting general paralysis of trade and industry in all branches,
which is inevitable if forced liquidation takes place which is so
destructive to labor and capital alike.
I am firmly convinced that if the United States had lately
had a large central bank of the banks, commensurate with our
greatness, notwithstanding the colossal pyramid of credit which
we have been building, we might have been let down by easy stages,
instead of falling off from the top of the building, producing a jar
that seems to have shaken the whole commercial world. I am also
convinced that if the last Congress had authorized asset or credit
currency on the American Bankers’ Association plan, when the
1907 spasm struck us, our troubles would simply have doubled.
Let us briefly diagnose the reasons therefor by a comparison
of European conditions with those of the United States as they
exist to-day.
Capital, specie, circulation, etc., of the great European single banks
of issue on or about June 30, igo6.
TABLE No. I.
In Million.
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The foregoing, practically banks of issue and not of deposit, show de-
mand liabilities versus coin reserves, as compared to the national banks of
issue in the United States, as follows:
In Millions.
Mark the fact that the great issuing banks of Europe hold 54 per cent
of demand liabilities in coin, as against only 7 per cent in the United States.
Mark that, as records show, the total currency issues by all
the other great European banks of deposit on June 30, igo6, ap-
proximated but t 5o millions of dollars, and when the charters of
the four German banks and those of Great Britain and Switzerland
expire, the right to issue currency by all of them being doomed,
there will be few left in Europe to issue currency except these
twenty great centralized banks and the new bank of Switzerland.
Do not the foregoing facts conclusively show that the progressive
European nations each have one great issuing bank, which might
be termed the governor to the engine, expanding and contracting
automatically without distrust, because they have immense coin
reserves and quick assets, and that the issue of credit or any other
kind of currency by small, independent banks has practically been
totally abolished all over Europe ?
This result in Europe was evidently brought about through the
dear school of experience. Let us touch upon a few most salient
instances abroad.
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France
John Law, nearly 200 years ago, after being turned down by
the keen Scotchmen, captured the French people with his plausible
populistic inflation scheme, and history tells us that France did not
recover from its terrible effects for fifty years. The statesmen
of France, not content with the John Law experiment, in conse-
quence of business depression in 1789, instead of manfully waiting
for a natural return of better days, in response to the popular
clamor for &dquo;more money,&dquo; sought to take a short cut to prosperity
by issuing heroic quack doses of fiat money for several years in
succession. Just as soon as the effects of the first issues began to
show symptoms of a reaction upon business, another larger dose
was administered to the already staggering patient.
The statesmen of France, in most eloquent perorations-which
might be likened to some in these latter days-swayed the multi-
tude so far that the intoxication for assignats grew until nearly
40,00o millions of francs were outstanding in 1797, a sum aggre-
gating nearly three times our whole circulating medium to-day.
With one fell swoop the French nation repudiated the whole issue.
The Bank of France was organized in 1800 with about $6,000,-
ooo capital, which at various times was increased, until to-day it
is about $35,000,000. It has power to issue notes with the fol-
lowing prerequisites, as dictated by Napoleon : &dquo;The notes shall be
covered either by coin held by the bank or by notes secured by
collateral or by notes signed by three responsible persons.&dquo; A
strong effort was made at that time to give the right of issue to
the banks generally in France, but Napoleon answered in sub-
stance,-It is easter to watch one bank of issue than it is to
watch great numbers. IIis logic exactly condemns the American
Bankers’ Association plan to-day. What has been the result in
France ? The foregoing table shows :
to circulation outstanding, the bank still would show about 73
per cent of coin against all liabilities, as against 7 per cent for the
national banks of the United States. We must not forget also that
the $255.3 millions of loans are of a much more liquid character
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than are those of the national banks generally throughout the United
States.
The Bank of France has been managed with such consummate
skill that even during the Franco-German war the depreciation of
its notes was only 4 per cent. It also during the past century ren-
dered invaluable aid by loaning coin to the Bank of England during
several crises in Britain. The bank, with its vast coin reserves and
quick assets has been enabled to loan freely to all solvent parties
under panic conditions, thus undoubtedly preventing panics at times,
and it has steadied the financial convulsions in France for a century.
The Bank of France has had the sole right of issue in France
since 1848. Its uncovered currency averages about 120 million
dollars, which indicates no currency inflation in France as against
ooo millions in the United States to-day.
England,
The Bank of England was chartered in 1694. Although it
was of great value to mercantile interests in several financial crises,
yet as the bank had limitless authority to issue notes, and there
was no rule as to coin reserves from 1694 to 1844, at which date
Peel’s Act &dquo;gave the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street the straight
jacket she has worn ever since,&dquo; Bagehot, in his classic work
entitled &dquo;Lombard Street,&dquo; says, &dquo;This unbridled authority was
in more than one instance used with’ the extremest unwisdom, so
that devastating panics followed hard upon the heels of the reck-
less speculation which too great facilities for borrowing had engen-
dered.&dquo; Such dearly-bought experiences ought to warn us against
easy methods of inflation. English statesmen battled for a quarter
of a century with the subject of whether gold was at a premium
or a redundant quantity of Bank of England notes at a discount.
The question was finally settled in 1816 by the adoption of the pro-
found &dquo;Bullion Report of 1810.&dquo; The integrity of her gold stan-
dard of payments has since been maintained with a fidelity that
commands the admiration and confidence of the whole world, to
the extent that London is the world’s clearing house, and practi-
cally all the nations of the earth pay tribute to Britain. The para-
mount question to us is, how soon will New York City displace
London as the world’s clearing house, if we keep on injecting more
non-standard currency into our already redundant currency issues?
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Under Peel’s Act, the banks of Great Britain in 1844 were
restricted on issues of bank notes to the amount then outstanding
by the banks then existing. Seventy per cent of the right of issue
of those banks which have closed since 1844, has reverted to the
Bank of England, thus reducing the total uncovered issues allowed
to banks in general, all of which are subject to the unlimited
liability act as to note issues, to the small sum of approximately
~8,000,000, and has increased the issues of the Bank of England
since 1844 from 114,000,000 to about £18,175,ooo based on securi-
ties. All other issues of the bank are covered with gold coin or
bullion, ’thus making the notes practically gold certificates and giv-
ing the Bank of England the sole right of issue in Britain. The
total uncovered issues in Britain average about $120,000,000, of
which $go,ooo,ooo are Bank of England notes based on govern-
ment securities. Scotch banks, so much harped about, can issue
but fa,6~6,35o uncovered notes. As extraordinary troubles require
extraordinary remedies, in order to ameliorate some of the calami-
tous panic conditions which have overtaken Britain, history says,
the Bank of England in 1847, 1857 and 1866, after the panics had
paralyzed her progress, on the assurance of the government officials
that no prosqcution would follow, suspended the bank act as to
issuing notes only on the deposit of a like amount of either coin
or bullion, and it issued notes to the banking department on deposit
by it with the issue department of ample securities. This was
an unlawful act, giving elasticity to the currency, but it placed
the banking department in an easy condition to &dquo;discount freely
to all solvent parties.&dquo; Again, in 1838, the bank borrowed ~a,5oo,-
ooo from the Bank of France during panic conditions, and in isgo,
during the Baring troubles, she borrowed ~3,000,000 ; besides
~2,000,000 from outside sources, and the panics were stayed. The
Barings failed for $105,ooo,ooo and yet their indebtedness was
liquidated by the Bank of England with the aid of other local banks
without general suspension of cash payments as experienced in the
last months of 1907 in the United States. The apparent neces-
sity for these extraordinary acts was that the country had reached
a commercial crisis where good securities could not be sold for
cash. Suspension and consequent ruin were staring sound com-
mercial houses and banks in the face.
In each case the action of the bank afforded instant relief and
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doubtless saved hundreds of millions of dollars to tottering houses
unable to meet payments except for ~,uch relief. As soon as the
pressure was over the illegal issues were retired.
These unlawful acts were parallel to our clearing-house cer-
tificates, except that clearing-house certificates have but limited use,
whereas the Bank of England notes satisfy the insane demands
of frightened depositors and give sufficient elasticity to meet neces-
sary demands for loans to solvent parties so that the wheels of
commerce be not stilled. Should the Bank of England be legally
empowered to relieve extraordinary pressure on the same lines as
in 1847, 1857 and 1866 before paralysis takes place, the benefits
undoubtedly would be incalculable. Nearly all political economists
criticize this feature, which seems to be the only material defect,
without which the Bank of England would be ideal in practically
all respects.
Gerynany
With the exception of only four banks, which are allowed
to issue say eighteen millions of dollars of uncovered notes-and
these privileges are doomed-the Imperial Bank of Germany monop-
olizes that right. The bank is allowed to issue now about
$112,500,000 uncovered circulation under certain restrictions. Any
excess over that sum must pay 5 per cent interest per annum to
the government. This excess issue is the only true iiiethod by
which to obtain relief under panic conditions, as the interest rate
will certainly retire the redundant currency as soon as the pres-
sure for funds is over, thus preventing inflation.
It is a noteworthy fact that the Imperial Bank of Germany
has raised its discount rate to 7 per cent but once in thirty years,
except during our panic of 1907, when its rate was raised. to
70 per cent. It is also a noteworthy fact that during that
thirty-year period the bank issued such 5 per cent taxed currency
121 times as a relief measure under pressure. The Austro-Hun-
garian bank did likewise under similar conditions fifty-five times
in the past eighteen years. In the face of the fact that interest
rates are lower there than here, such 5 per cent taxed currency auto-
matically expands under pressure and contracts as soon as the
pressure is over, thus preventing inflation. This fact defies theory
and upsets the absurd claim that a high taxed currency imposes
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such a tax on commerce that banks will not use it. Germany’s
uncovered currency averages say $150,000,000, which is a wide
contrast to our $goo,ooo,ooo and over to-day.
But enough. These details and the foregoing table are con-
clusive evidence that elasticity in Europe, by an evolutionary
process, has been achieved without producing distrust or inflation.
Issuing Currency is not a Necessary Banking Function
Further, it does not seem to be a necessary function of banks
generally in Europe to issue currency at all. As state and other
banks in the United States issue no currency, I assert the special
privilege ought to be abolished as to the other third, as soon as
the banks owning the abnormally low rate 2 per cent interest
bonds can obtain payment for them. Banks holding them run
great risk of material depreciation should the government for
any cause be compelled to issue large sums additional. Let the
United States sell its bonds strictly on their merits, as every
other nation does. This result ought to be brought about by
a slow evolutionary process, and under natural economic laws
the channels of circulation would automatically fill the vacuum
created with the world’s standard-gold. Adam Smith gives an
illustration in point in his &dquo;Wealth of Nations&dquo;-&dquo;Money, like
wine, must always be scarce with those who have neither the
wherewithal to buy or the credit to borrow it. Those who have
either will seldom be in want of either the money or the wine
which they have occasion for, and a country that has where-
withal to buy gold or silver, will never be in want of those
metals.&dquo; I am strongly impressed that the United States has
the wherewithal to buy all the gold and silver we need for a
basis of our circulating medium. If some of the poor sections
of our country are short on circulation, is it not because they
are also short on collateral or wherewithal to buy it?
The Lesson from American History
Let us turn to the United States without specific reference
to the disastrous results of continental currency in the eighteenth
century, which might be excusable, as the birth of the nation
was at stake. The &dquo;History of Banking in all Nations&dquo; says,
in referring to all banks of issue from 1739 to 1841, &dquo;The esti-
/.Q,1 ,%
’
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mated losses on their circulation were 18.1 millions of dollars.&dquo;
Again, on page 337-under &dquo;Free and Safety Fund Banking in
New York State,&dquo; &dquo;the notes of twenty-five of them were re-
jected, and all the safety fund notes were at a discount.&dquo; Again,
&dquo;In December ( r8q.o), it was reported that few brokers would
buy the notes of any free banking association,&dquo; &dquo;and the notes
of many of the safety fund banks of the interior are regarded
with great distrust.&dquo; John J. Knox, in his history says that
from 1789 to 1864 &dquo;the probable losses to noteholders were
about 5 per cent per annum.&dquo; Further, the circulating notes
of the state banks were subject to violent expansion in times of
confidence and sudden contraction when distrust occurred. The
runs on the banks were not made by the depositors (for they
were few), but by the noteholders.
The pages of these authorities, as well as many others, are
strewn with proofs of the sickening details of losses to noteholders,
caused by bank issues, some based on credit and others based on
various collaterals, clear through the eighteenth, and even past
the middle of the nineteenth century. Because much of the currency
issued during the latter period was secured by collaterals instead
of being a pure credit currency, the nineteenth century experiences
lessened materially the comparative losses to noteholders every-
where, but still they were calamitous in results up to the end of
the &dquo;wild cat&dquo; days in the United States. Two generations have
passed since then wherein no man has lost a moment’s sleep over
his absolutely secured national bank notes. We ought not to need,
like children, to be told to keep away from the fire. We ought to
profit by the experience of the past before trouble overtakes us
again.
That word &dquo;elasticity&dquo; is a sweet morsel to play upon the
credulity of an innocent public. It has worried the political econo-
mists of all ages. Its ghost still stalks forth in this enlightened day.
Panics and the Monetary Standard
All property was measured in depreciated currency in 1865,
when gold was 100 per cent premium and over. Then the premium
began to decline year by year, and all property in proportion, until
18ï3, by which time values had shrunk to about one-half of the
prices of 1865. This process undermined all prosperity and was
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the underlying cause of the panic of 1873. After specie payments
were resumed in 1879 confidence and prosperity revived with a
bound, and they have been forging onward and upward ever since
at a pace which has astonished the world. A campaign of education
has been constantly and successfully waged toward the establish-
ment of the world’s standard-gold-upon an unequivocal founda-
tion. Distrust of our standard halted us from 1893 to 1896, when
the repudiators were repudiated, and since that date the Gold Stan-
dard Act of March 14, 1900, has been written into our statutes,
and thus the battle of the standards has been practically won.
There are tw o links missing to complete the chain. They are the
elimination of some of our redundant soft money issues, and the
adoption of some sound relief measure when panic threatens.
Since 1896, when confidence was restored as to the integrity
of our standard of value, the wave of prosperity has been almost
continuously rising higher and higher. Under the impetus of rapid
fortunes acquired by some Napoleons of finance since 1896, who
foresaw that a swelling tide of prosperity was at hand, the get-rich-
quick fever intoxicated the many. Nature has been generous in
her bounties to us, thus aiding in the development of the rising
tide. Another force has been the immense increase in the world’s
production of gold for the past few years, which doubtless has
stimulated the activities and credit expansion of the whole com-
mercial world.
During this period our credit system has grown to collossal
proportions. As shown by official statistics, our banking power
has increased from 5,150 millions of dollars in 1890 to nearly 18,000
millions of dollars on January i, 1908, which nearly equals the
banking power of the rest of the world. The individual deposits
have more than trebled in that period, which largely represents
actual not fictitious capital. The gigantic general statistics of our
wonderful progress and present condition are too numerous and
too well known to repeat.
During the past ten years our circulating medium has doubled
in quantity (from 1,500 to 3,000 millions of dollars), until, as a basis
for this mighty superstructure of credit, we hold the following
amounts of the world’s standard of value, that stands through storm
as well as sunshine:
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By way of comparison with the most progressive nations,
permit the following approximate :
This table shows the United States has nearly as much silver
as Great Britain, France and Germany combined, and more than
twice as much uncovered currency as all combined. It also shows
a per capita circulation almost equal to that of France, where cash
instead of checks is used much more extensively than here. This
per capita circulation is also so far in excess of either Great Britain
or Germany that the redundancy of our currency must be apparent
to all.
The Barometric Signal
In view- of all these facts, even before the explosion caused by
the wild speculation and pyramid banking of the Heinze, Morse,
Thomas, etc., outfit ; in view of the fact that a high interest rate
the world over is the sure barometric signal that the great pyramid
of credit has grown beyond the limits of prudence; in view of the
handwriting upon the wall as recorded by all the standard author-
ities on political economy that optimism had outrun conservatism,
and that the primary cause of our troubles is over-speculation, I will
only quote in proof from one standard authority. Professor Sum-
ner, in his &dquo;History of American Currency.&dquo; tersely sums up the
case as follows : &dquo;Over-speculation is speculation which outstrips
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the capital of the country ;&dquo; further, &dquo;When we lose our heads in
the intoxication of our own achievements, look on currency antici-
pations, which are only fictitious capital, as if they were real, use
them as already earned, build other expansions upon them, then
we bring a convulsion and a downfall ; some time or other a liqui-
dation must come: ... then credit breaks down and there
must be a settlement, a liquidation, a dividend, a new start.&dquo; I say,
in :ew of all these facts, I cannot understand why the powers that
be in the great American Bankers’ Association, who ought to be the
leaders in conservatism, should undertake to bring about a senti-
ment to commit this country to eighteenth century fiatism again,
by the issue-on top of our vast volume of soft money issues-of
over two hundred million dollars of asset or credit currency, as a
starter only, according to one of the most aggressive advocates,
with only 5 per cent secured and 95 per cent fiat, under the plea
of providing an elastic currency to move the crops, notwithstanding
crops could not move faster, as transportation facilities have been
taxed to their utmost for years. Who wants to move the earth
to-day and lie idle to-morrow?
The American Bankers’ Association Plan
The American Bankers’ Association plan, boiled down and put
in cold type, can fairly be diagnosed in this way:
( ) National banks (none others need apply), big and little,
in city or country, can indite a letter as follows :
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Please send to this bank the $25,000, $50,000 or $100,000
of asset or credit currency to which it may be entitled; keep
5 per cent of it on deposit as collateral security; express the
other 95 per cent to us, and we will return the same to you at




(2) The Comptroller of the Currency shall designate numer-
ous redemption cities conveniently located in various parts of the
I - I
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country. through the agency of the banks in such cities ade-
quate facilities shall be provided for active daily redemption of
credit notes. (The advocates of this redemption plan now admit
it impractical, so no answer to it is necessary.)
(3) A bank (credit) note is essentially the same in principle
as a deposit payable on demand. This is an amazing conclusion.
Political economists say, &dquo;Coined credit&dquo; in the shape of I O U’s.
issued by banks is fictitious capital. A deposit generally repre-
sents actual capital, so no further argument on that point seems
necessary.
In reply to the foregoing I issued the following five chal-
lenges in a debate before the State Bankers’ Association of Minne-
sota in July, i9o7, in response to John L. Hamilton, ex-President
of the American Bankers’ Association, who advocated the Amer-
ican Bankers’ Association plan, to wit:
( i ) I respectfully challenge any member of the currency com-
mittee or any advocate of asset currency to point to a single pro-
gressive country on the earth where small, independent country
banks are allowed to issue currency backed by only 5 per cent
collateral, the remaining 95 per cent of such currency being purely
fiat.
(2) I challenge any man to prove that easy methods of issuing
currency have not been discarded in all progressive nations.
(3) I challenge any man to disprove the fact that, with but few
exceptions, where charters have not expired, in all progressive
nations, only great centralized banks, with very large reserves and
rigid restrictions as to loans, are allowed to issue currency at all,
and the right to issue is limited under rigid restrictions referred to
later.
(4) I challenge any man to prove that the method of redemp-
tion proposed-which the asset currency advocates claim as the
crucial test of success or failure-has any parallel on earth, or
affords any practical assurance that it will work under our bank-
ing system.
(5) I challenge any man to prove that &dquo;a bank note is essen-
tially the same in principle as a deposit payable on demand,&dquo; or
that &dquo;it resembles in character ... a current deposit liability
of the bank.&dquo;
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After the debate what was the verdict of the Minnesota jury?
The answer is found in the condemnation of the American Bank-
ers’ Association plan, as will be seen by the passage of the follow-
ing resolution unanimously :
WHEREAS, The prosperity of our country is due in a large measure to
the absolute confidence of our people in our present currency, be it
Resolved, That while we are strongly in favor of some well-secured
method to relieve monetary stringencies that will not produce inflation, yet
we are unalterably opposed to any plan or change in our currency that does
not afford absolute security; hence we do not look with favor upon the plan
proposed by the American Bankers’ Association committee.
Later, after listening to John Perrin, President of the Ameri-
can National Bank of Indianapolis and member of the association
currency committee, in favor of its plan, the State Bankers’ Asso-
ciation of Wisconsin passed the same resolutions with only two
dissenting voices. Still later,-after the meeting of the American
Bankers’ Association at Atlantic City, when, with practically an
empty house and under discreditable conditions, the plan was
apparently endorsed,-the State Bankers’ Association of Indiana,
after a full debate on the same subject, where O. A. Watts, Presi-
dent of the First National Bank, of Nashville, Tenn., took the affir-
mative, and I had the honor of the negative side, notwithstanding
a strong effort to table the resolutions by able representatives of
the American Bankers’ Association, the Hoosiers turned down the
plan by indorsing in full the same resolutions.
These facts, representing the judgment of bankers when a fair
hearing could be had, indicate clearly that the banks of the country
generally are against fiat money. The committee of the American
Bankers’ Association evidently doubted the soundness of their own
proposition, as is evidenced by the self-indictment contained in the
following quotation taken from the Atlantic City currency com-
mittee reported to the convention :
In all our recommendations principle has, to a greater or less degree,
been subordinated to practicability. We have recommended, not what we
believe, in the light of experience and existing conditions, to be best for the
interests subserved, but what, in the light of existing political conditions,
we believe to be attainable, not what was best, but what we might reasonably
hope to obtain.
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President Roosevelt’s Opinion
President Roosevelt clearly grasps the essential weakness of
the plan, as will be seen in the following quotations from his last
message to Congress, when he refers to the absorbing currency
question :
We need greater elasticity in our currency; provided, of course, that
we recognize the even greater need of a safe and secured currency, ...
Provision should be made for an emergency currency. The emergency issue
should, of course, be made with an effective guaranty, and upon conditions
carefully prescribed by the government. Such emergency issue must be based
on adequate securities approved by the government and must be issued under
a heavy tax. This would permit currency being issued when the demand for
it was urgent, while securing its retirement as the demand f ell off.
The Aldrich Bill
And now comes the Finance Committee of the United States
Senate with a bill, in all its essential features, demanding absolute
security for all issues to prevent distrust; with such a high tax-
6 per cent-as will bring such currency out only under stress, and
will surely retire it as soon as pressure is over, thus preventing
further inflation. These essentials seem to be ignored under the
American Bankers’ Association plan, because, under it, the currency,
if issued, would be practically unsecured and would still further
inflate our circulation.
The American Bankers’ Association plan undoubtedly would
arouse distrust in the minds of the masses, especially in troublous
times, when it is of paramount importance to allay distrust. When
panic is on, as the asset currency advocates claim a deposit is the
same thing as asset currency, and local depositors are clamoring for
cash, why will not eighty million holders of such currency demand
coin on their notes, thus more than doubling our troubles under
panic conditions? This is exactly what occurred in fiat monev
days. Taint our currency issues with a breath of suspicion, and
our prosperity will be undermined as by an insidious disease. Even
the first lien on assets, which would make the currency secure, but
which would rob the depositors, is eliminated under this plan, thus
increasing general distrust. Again, as the quick redemption theory
will not work, which is now admitted by asset currency advocates,
does any sane man believe that any bank in the United States
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with a right to issue asset currency, practically without collateral,
paying only 2y2 per cent per annum for the use of it, in the face
of a 6 to 10 per cent interest rate clear through 1907, would not
have kept out the whole permissible amount for the profit in it,
thus stretching the rubber currency to the limit. Under such con-
ditions the reservoir would have been empty when the panic of
1907 struck us. Would not the very object sought, relief under
panic conditions, be defeated? The result would simply spell in-
flation, and inflation spells disaster. Such currency would ex-
pand, but not contract. The currency committee seems to have lost
sight of the fundamental principle of Gresham’s law. Britain, after
a campaign as long and as bitter as ours over the Gresham Law,
and the expulsion of her gold by the injection of too many bank
notes into her circulation, unequivocally adopted the gold standard
in 1816. The integrity of that standard, as against the uncertainties
of other national standards, has been maintained with a fidelity that
commands the confidence of the whole world to such an extent
that London has long been the world’s clearing house. Will New
York soon win that position if we inject an additional quantity off
inferior currency into our circulation ?
A wise man buildeth his house upon a rock, but the foolish
man upon the sand. When the rain descends and the floods come
and the winds blow, the wise man’s house falleth not, but as to
the foolish man’s house, great is the fall thereof. Is not this a
perfect simile to apply to the building up of the superstructure of
our credit system upon a sound metallic currency for a founda-
tion as against the shifting sands of a credit currency? The pages
of history are strewn with proofs that when the great instrument
of exchange is deranged, all trade, all industry, is stricken as with
a palsy. That instrument of exchange recognized by the world as
the solid foundation that does not totter when the storm rages in
its severest intensity, is the only foundation for a prosperous people
to rest upon and to-day our coffers hold sixteen hundred million
dollars of it. This is a billion dollar country, and we need these
resources. This gold has come to us since 1873 in the natural
course of trade, in response to the well-known principles of the
Gresham law and monetary science, as expounded by Adam
Smith, Ricardo, Jevons, Sumner and many other eminent econo-
mists, and as also clearly set forth in what Professor Sumner dubs
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the most important document in financial literature, &dquo;The Cele-
brated Bullion Report of 1810 to the House of Commons.&dquo; I
have quoted these maxims before, but deep-seated error requires
repetition of them again and again. Summed up these principles
are:
( ) The cry of all ages is for &dquo;more money.&dquo;
(2) Rich countries will have all the coin they need, providing
no impolitic act of legislation interferes to force it out of circula-
tion by the injection of inferior currencies.
(3) When the coin in any country exceeds the effectual de-
mand, no vigilance of government can prevent its exportation.
(4) It is the province of government to settle the quality ques-
tion of money, and the needs of commerce will settle the quantity.
In proof of the above maxims, history says, Chinese walls, jails,
shot guns or hanging did not prevent exportation of coin, and in
these modern days the object lesson of the exportation of more than
thirty millions of gold in May and June, 1907, in the face of high
interest rates and the plea of the asset currency advocates for
&dquo;more money in the United States,&dquo; is more potent than pages
of logic. Let us fix the &dquo;quality&dquo; question and stop tinkering with
the &dquo;quantity,&dquo; as the needs of commerce will settle that.
With over 1,700 million dollars of soft money in the United
States to-day, would not the injection of 200 to 300 millions of
inferior asset or credit currency drive the same amount of gold
out under the Gresham Law, thus undermining our metallic foun-
dation for our great credit superstructure? Let us bend our ener-
gies to increase our metallic foundation and reduce our redundant
soft money issues, if we would avoid trouble as far as human in-
genuity can accomplish it. The only true remedy to compel con-
servatism is to penalize over-expansion of credit, instead of adding
an unsecured asset currency stimulant. Throw a life line out to the
over-confident, and he will be swimming beyond his depth con-
tinually.
Asset Currency Fallacies
The asset currency advocates are continually referring to the
Canadian and Suffolk systems, also isolated cases in Indiana, Louis-
iana, Iowa and other states, as parallel to our conditions. Their
arguments are as full of holes as a skimmer, and so-called parallels
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are as closely related as the Equator is to the North Pole. They
are also continually quoting general European branch banking
methods as systems for us to adopt. I stand with the masses of
bankers of the country against a few great central banks owning all
the banks of the country, because under that system, the branches
practically pay no taxes where they are located ; there is no real board
of directors ; few, if any, stockholders to whom dividends would be
declared; in short the system simply skims the cream from the
country towns to enrich the exchequers of the great centers, as is
conclusively proved by the abnormally large profits made by the
great central banks owning such branches.
A National Reserve Bank
As our independent banking system has worked wonders in
the upbuilding of our hamlets and cities; as the quality. of our
money is unquestioned, and the quantity more than ample for nor-
mal conditions ; as Europe has more nearly solved the &dquo;Elastic
Problem&dquo; with fewer objectionable features than any plan yet
suggested; why cannot we reject as entirely unnecessary the gen-
eral branch banking feature, continue, if thought best, the United
States sub-treasuries, with modifications as to cash holdings, and
bring about elasticity through a national reserve bank. Such a
bank would be owned by the banks of the country, and thus the
profits would be theirs.
The capital stock might be $5o,ooo,ooo and be taken in sums
of not to exceed 5 per cent of the capital of each subscribing bank,
to prevent monopoly. The Comptroller of the Currency, Secretary
of the Treasury and United States Treasurer should be members
of the Board of Directors. The National Reserve Bank, if such
we may call it, might have authority to issue up to $250,000,000 of
national bank notes, as ,an experimental limit, under a tax of 6
per cent to drive it home as soon as pressure is over.
Again, under strained conditions, or when frightened depos-
itors are demanding cash, and solvent merchants and manufac-
turers are calling for loans to pay bills and keep the wheels of
commerce from being stilled, where is the banker that will not
temporarily provide cash, if possible, at 6 per cent or even a higher
rate, if necessary, instead of slaughtering sound securities in a
hard market? Do not many bankers when capital demands exceed
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supply, get rediscounts now, and is much comment made unless
rediscounts become excessive?
No interest should be paid upon deposits, nor should loans
be made upon stocks, thus giving no aid to the stock gambling
element. Such issues should be loaned only under conservative
restrictions on quickly convertible securities. I believe if such a
bank had been open in October, 1907, the panic with its train of evils
might have been avoided, because the gamblers who were the
cause of the outbreak could have been refused aid and thus have
been weeded out as a future menace. The sound and solvent banks
of New York could have been furnished with all the cash needed,
because they have ample sound collateral. The country calls for
balances in New York could have been promptly met with cash.
Suspension of cash payments then would not have been necessary,
and the result would have been that the whole country would not
have been compelled to restrict cash payments nor to issue clearing-
house certificates.
On the other hand, if the American Bankers’ Association’s
2y2 or 3 per cent currency plan had been authorized last winter,
the full limit would have been out for the profit in it when the
panic struck us. The National Reserve Bank plan will accomplish
the object sought in an absolutely sound manner; it will checkmate
locking up cash, as was done some months ago by a &dquo;bear&dquo; to the
extent of $5,000,000 in an attempt to bring on another Black Friday
onslaught. The banks of the country will not hoard money in
excess of needs, because they will know relief is at hand if needed.
It will not lead the bankers of the country generally to further
expand their credit and thus feed the fires of speculation which
have already gone beyond the limits of conservatism. It will not
drive gold out of the country under Gresham’s Law by the injec-
tion of any more inferior currencies, which must be avoided if our
standard of values is to be maintained, and if New York City
is ever to become the world’s financial center. It will furnish
cash at times when necessary to move the crops, or under panic
conditions to loan to all solvent parties, that the wheels of com-
merce be not stilled and general paralysis result. The rate of
interest will automatically drive home the extra issues as soon
as confidence is restored ; inflation will not result and the machinery
will be ready for the next urgent call; 10, 20, 50, 100 per cent
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money will be unknown ; the Secretary of the Treasury will heave
a sigh of relief from pressing importunities ; every bank in the
country, whether national, state, private, savings or trust company,
will, directly or indirectly, get relief if entitled to it. In the matter
under discussion clearly the trend of all progressive countries is
toward the concentration of the power to issue currency.
If this plan cannot be accomplished, then the plan brought out
by the Senate Finance Committee, as a modification of Treasurer
Treat’s plan, will accomplish the relief sought, by the issue of
extra currency amply secured to prevent distrust, with a tax suffi-
ciently high to prevent inflation. These requirements are the main
essentials.
A third plan, which would accomplish the relief sought, would
be the issue of currency based on clearing-house certificates, such
as have been lately issued. Such certificates should be deposited
with the United States Treasurer as security for such issues. It
is cash that fills demands and kills panic.
I prefer the central bank plan, because the machinery works
smoothly and automatically, more so than under the second plan,
and much more so than under the third. All three are sound, and
infinitely better than asset currency, which will only produce dis-
trust and inflation. Confidence upbuilds, distrust destroys. States-
manship alone should reign. Whatever plan is provided, our stan-
dard of value should never be tarnished, because distrust breeds
panic. On the contrary our currency should be above suspicion,
that confidence, the great bulwark of all progress may be ours
to the fullest possible extent.
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